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APPARENT AUTHORITY AND UNDISCLOSED
PRINCIPAL UNDER GERMAN LAW
In spite of its almost total economic devastation at the end
of World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany' has become
one of the world's most prosperous countries. The direct foreign
investment opportunities resulting from this remarkable economic
growth continue to encourage Americans to select Germany as
the host country for their overseas investments. Those who en-
deavor to profit from these opportunities generally find that an
agency relationship is indispensable. However, the American in-
vestor who decides to pursue his business in Germany with the
assistance of one or more agents, exposes himself as a principal
to the hazard of unexpected liability. To avoid such liability,
a principal must be particularly concerned with two significant
areas of German agency law: apparent authority and undisclosed
principal, both of which hold him to a high standard of care.
Before the American investor can acquire an adequate un-
derstanding of the standard of care expected of him under these
two concepts, he must be familiar with the legal system of Ger-
many which differs, in many important respects, from that of the
United States. Germany is governed by a civil law legal system.
The only two sources of law are statute (Gesetz)2 and custom
(Gewohnheitsrecht).3 The basic law governing agency is con-
1. The Federal Republic of Germany is hereinafter referred to as Ger-
many.
The primary sources of authority for this Comment are German cases and
commentaries which have been translated from the original language by Susanne
Holmes-Born. This task of translating German legal writing into English has
been difficult since it was necessary not only to work for literal accuracy, but
also to convey the special meaning intended by the German writer. To minimize
the risk of improper usage and misinterpretation, the important concepts under
discussion will be given in German accompanied by the approximate English
translation.
2. Statutes consist of codes and other legal rules which are enacted by
state authorities. 1 E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 4 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as 1 COHN]. "In normal times . . . all laws must derive their validity
from the constitution which is the ultimate basis of all law." id. "The consti-
tutional law for the Federal Republic [of Germany] is now contained in the
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of 1949...." Id., at 8.
3. Id., at 4. Under German law:
Custom (Gewohnheitsrecht) is defined as the regular and general
public practice of law based on the opinion that a binding rule is being
1
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tained in the German Civil Code 4 which is supplemented by the
German Commercial Code5 in the case of commercial transac-
tions involving merchants.' In contrast to American common
law, German Civil Law does not recognize court decisions as
source of law nor does it make former decisions legally binding
on the courts.7 However, the German courts are nevertheless
strongly influenced by precedent, especially when the German
Federal Supreme Court or the German Federal Constitutional
Court consistently apply the same interpretation to a certain law. 8
put into effect . . . provided that this opinion is not exclusively due
to an error relating to the meaning of a written law.
Id.
4. The German Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch or BGB) will be re-
ferred to as Civil Code in the text [hereinafter cited as BGB]. BGB §§ 164-
181 (agency provisions). For an English translation of the Civil Code, see C.
WANG, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE (1907) [hereinafter cited as WANG].
5. The German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch or HGB) will, in
the text, be referred to as Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as HGB]. For
an English translation of the Commercial Code, see A. SCHUSTER, THE GERMAN
COMMERCIAL CODE (1911) [hereinafter cited as SCHUSTER].
6. Commercial matters are governed by the Commercial Code, but the Ci-
vil Code will control with respect to points not covered by the provisions of
the Commercial Code. HGB, Introductory Law (EGHGB), art. 2. Except for
certain small traders, all those who wish to become merchants must register in
the Register of Commerce which is maintained by the appropriate court (the
lower court or Amtsgericht). E. STEEFEL, TRADING UNDER THE LAWS OF GER-
MANY 13 (1956) [hereinafter cited as STEEFEL]. An agent's scope of authority,
or power of -representation, must be registered along with other facts relating
to the status of a merchant. Id. See also R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW
396-97 (2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as SCHLESINGER]. The Register of
Commerce is open to public inspection and anyone legitimately interested may
obtain copies of specific entries. HGB § 9.
In addition to the Civil and Commercial Codes, there are statutes (Gesetze)
which govern other areas of the law such as the Codes of Civil and Criminal
Procedure and the Criminal Code. Also, state (Ldinder) law and federal con-
stitutional law are equally important sources of German law. 1 COHN, supra
note 2, at 8.
7. COHN, supra note 2, at 4. "German law does not recognize the binding
force of precedent." Id. Under the German legal system," It is the oldest and
a permanent idea: the judge 'finds' the law, and does not make it." Rabel,
Private Laws of Western Civilization, 10 LA. L. REV. 265, 435 (1950) [herein-
after cited as Private Laws of Western Civilization]. There are some statutory ex-
ceptions to the rule that precedent has no binding effect. For example, a court
of appeals must refer a case concerning matters of criminal law to the Federal
Supreme Court when the former wishes to deviate from a prior opinion of the
latter. 1 CoHN, supra note 2, at 5.
8. 1 COHN, supra note 2, at 4. The German court system includes:
Amtsgericht (lowest court of first instance); Landgericht (has original jurisdic-
tion in civil cases involving an amount of more than DM 1500); Oberlandes-
gericht (appellate court reviewing judgments and decrees of the Amtsgericht or
2
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Rules which arise from a series of consistent court decisions
(stdndige Rechtsprechung) also have a high degree of influence.'
Legal writings, such as textbooks and commentaries, are likewise
not a source of law, but they may be used in court as authority
for pointing out the dominating opinion (herrschende Mei-
nung). 10
A number of relevant German cases, as well as legal writ-
ings, will be analyzed to demonstrate judicial application of the
Civil Code to various fact situations raising issues involving appar-
ent authority and undisclosed principal. These cases will illus-
trate the guidelines which the courts have adopted in deciding
such issues. The guidelines are strikingly similar to their Ameri-
can counterparts with respect to apparent authority." On the
other hand, the treatment given by German agency law to the
undisclosed principal relationship presents one of the greatest
contrasts.' 2 While American law recognizes "undisclosed princi-
pal" as agency, German law uniformly refuses to give it such
recognition.
Landgericht) [hereinafter cited as OLG]; Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme
Court, the highest court in civil and criminal matters) [hereinafter cited as BGH];
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, in all instances it
decides questions of constitutionality raised in a civil or criminal case). See
The Civil Law of the Federal Republic of Germany in UNITED STATES ARMY
EUROPE PAMPHLET 550-158, at 5-6 (1966).
9. 1 COHN, supra note 2, at 5.
10. Id., at 6.
11. Certain provisions of the American RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY will be hereinafter footnoted in order to highlight some similarities and
differences with respect to the treatment given to apparent authority and undis-
closed principal by both German and American agency law. The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY has been adopted for the purpose of offering a condensed
version of American agency law.
All references made to "contracts" will concern agent-third party contracts
unless otherwise specified. Also, unless stated otherwise, reference to any special
agency relationship, such as master and servant or independent contractor, will
be made to illustrate a general rather than a special rule of agency. For defi-
nitions of master and servant and independent contractor see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2 & 14N (1957).
At this point it should be noted that German agency law refers only to
the undertaking of legal transactions (juristic acts) in behalf of another. For
example, it does not apply to cases involving non-juristic or unlawful acts by
a servant. Miiller-Freienfels, Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 165, 169
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Law of Agency].
12. Id., at 178. The German rule is that an indirect agency relationship
(or undisclosed principal) is not included within the concept of agency. This
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It is dangerous for the American investor in Germany to
engage in business without considering another fundamental dif-
ference between the German and American legal systems. The
German courts thoroughly combine the principles of equity with
an application of the law in every decision they render.1" This
is, of course, opposed to the American view which still distin-
guishes between law and equity. Thus, a principal must contin-
uously observe the spirit, as well as the letter, of German law
if he is to avoid unforseen liability.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN AGENCY LAW
As German agency law is primarily governed by the Civil
Code, a glance at the concepts which had a significant influence
upon the Civil Code's development should yield a better under-
standing of this subject. Of particular importance, are the Ro-
man law concept of mandate and the dualistic theory of represen-
tation.
In ancient Rome, mandate was a gratuitous form of contract
whereby the mandatarius was authorized by the mandator to con-
clude a legal transaction in the interest of the latter.' 4 The duty
of the mandatarius arose immediately upon acceptance of this
obligation and was thereafter enforceable by the mandator in a
civil action.' 5 Also, the mandator had a duty to indemnify the
mandatarius against loss and liability incurred during the execu-
tion of the mandate.16 This duty was enforceable by the manda-
tarius in an action under the mandate-contract.
Mandate closely approached the practice of agency' 7 in the
13. The combination is evident, in that "Equity in civil laws . . . is not
a branch of law but an inherent element of legal thought, present in the great
majority of . . . judicial decisions." Private Laws of Western Civilization, supra
note 7, at 436. "German law has always been one unified system of law in
which there was and is neither need nor room for a separate system of equity."
1 COHN, supra note 2, at 3.
14. See 3 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 128
(1962) [hereinafter cited as CONFLICT OF LAWS]. See also W. BUCKLAND, THE
MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 278 (1931) [hereinafter cited as
MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW].
15. See MAIN INSTRUCTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 14, at 278.
16. See A. PRICHARD, LEAGE'S ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 370 (3d ed. 1961). See
also F. LAWSON, THE ROMAN LAW READER 100-02 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
LAWSON].
17. "[Algency, as we understand the notion, was in fact unkown to the
Romans in the law of contract." W. BUCKLAND & A. MCNAm, ROMAN LAW
AND COMMON LAW 218 (2d rev. ed. 1965).
4
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sense that the mandatarius was obligated to act in behalf of the
mandator. 8 Unlike agency, the mandatarius was treated as hav-
ing entered into the contract with the third party alone. 9 The
conduct of the mandatarius never created any immediate legal
consequences for the mandator. The mandator was treated as
a stranger to the contract until the interest of the mandatarius
was assigned to him.20
In 1871, following a somewhat random evolution of agency
law, Paul Laband published an article in which he discussed the
Roman law concept of mandate from a perspective that had sub-
stantial appeal to the drafters of the Civil Code. In his article
dealing with the doctrine of representation,2' Laband distin-
guished the term "agency" from the term "authority". "Agency",
he said, indicated the internal relationship or underlying contract
(mandate) between the agent (mandatarius) and his principal
(mandator). "Authority", on the other hand, indicated the external
relationship between the agent and the third party.2
Laband observed that the mandate established and defined
the internal relationship between the principal and agent. It ob-
ligated the agent to follow the instructions of the principal and
it served to limit the duties and privileges of the agent to act
on the principal's behalf.2 3  Authority enabled the agent to con-
fer rights and duties upon the principal by concluding, in the
latter's name, legal transactions with a third party.
24
As a corollary to the theory that representation may be
broken down into an internal and external relationship, Laband
asserted that both relationships were entirely independent of one
another. 25  This dualistic theory of representation ultimately be-
18. MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 14, at 278.
19. CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 14, at 128. The legal consequences
arising from indirect agency under German law are similar to those arising from
the mandator-mandatarius relationship.
20. CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 14, at 128. The "[M]andate covered
only the relations between principle and agent." LAWSON, supra note 16, at 103.
21. CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 14, at 129.
22. Id. See Miiller-Freienfels, Legal Relations in the Law of Agency:
Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 193, 197-99
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty].
23. Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty, supra note 22, at 197-
99.
24. Id.
25. See generally id., at 197-207.
Vol. 4
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came incorporated in the Civil Code's basic structure in 1896.26
The Code distinguishes the mandate from the power of represen-
tation by including the regulations governing each of these con-
cepts in two separate books.2 7  Book one sets forth general prin-
ciples and delineates the agent's power to create legal conse-
quences for the principal (external relationship). 2  This power
is called a power of representation (Stellvertretung); the agent
to whom it has been given is said to have received "authority".29
Book two, on the other hand, offers guidance to one who wishes
to confer upon a person the competence to act as an agent. 3°
It sets forth the law of obligations and regulates the various types
of contracts which may be employed in establishing the mandate
(internal relationship)."1
The draftsmen of the Civil Code in adopting Laband's doc-
trine, were motivated by their desire to protect the third party
in his dealings with an agency relationship. By making the
agent's authority independent of the contract of mandate between
the principal and agent, the draftsmen indicated that, under ordi-
nary circumstances, the third party should not be expected to in-
quire into the details of the mandate. 32  The third party should
only be called upon to act with prudence and good faith in reli-
ance upon the agent's authority. 33  If the circumstances were
26. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 14, at 130. See also SCHLESINGER,
supra note 6, at 395-96.
27. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 396.
28. Id., at 395-96.
29. Id., at 395.
30. See id., at 396. See generally Law of Agency, supra note 11, at 171-
73.
31. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 395-96. For a discussion of the
rights and obligations of one who accepts a mandate (called a mandatary or
Auftragnehmer), see generally STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 53. The author cate-
gorizes the employment of the mandatary as a form of "agency by contract."
Id., at 52. A mandate "is based on friendship, favor, complaisance, courtesy
or similar consideration, and it is governed entirely by the regulations of the
Civil Code." Id., at 53.
32. See text accompanying note 27 supra. See also SCHLESINGER, supra
note 6, at 396.
33. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 395. See BGH, Judgment of February
28, 1966, 1966 ZErrscmFT FOR DAs NOTARIAT IN BADEN-WORTTEMBERG 338(L),
in which the Federal Supreme Court mentioned that the third party generally
does not have a special duty to inquire of an agent whether he has been re-
stricted by the principal as to his use of agency when the agency appears unlim-
ited to the third party. But see text accompanying notes 77-85 infra, for a dis-
cussion which points out that the third party must not be negligent in failing
to recognize that the agent misused his authority.
6
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such that a reasonable man would question the existence of an
agent's authority, then the third party would be regarded as negli-
gent if he failed to do so.
The theory that authority is independent of the internal rela-
tionship (mandate) remains today as a fundamental feature of
German agency law. A principal cannot ignore this theory if
he wishes to limit his liability for the acts of his agent.
II. PRESENT GERMAN AGENCY LAW
Prior to an analysis of apparent authority and undisclosed
principal, it is necessary that the general nature of authority be
examined. "Authority" (Vollmacht) is basically recognized as
an agent's power to create legal consequences directly as between
his principal and a third party by concluding legal transactions
in the principal's name.14  A principal may, by giving his agent
the authority to conclude contracts with others, become entitled
to all rights and liabilities under such contracts. 35
34. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 395-96. See also Power of Agency
and Commercial Certainty, supra note 22, at 198-99. An agency relationship
in which an agent may, by contracting with a third party, create legal conse-
quences directly as between the principal and third party, has been called "direct
agency" (unmittelbare Vertretung). See Soergel-Siebert, Kommentar zum
Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 164, pt. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Soer-
gel-Siebert] and BGB § 164(1). Furthermore, the power of the agent to create
such legal consequences has been called a "power of representation" (Stellvertre-
tung). See SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 395. "A power of representation cre-
ated by an act of the principal is called 'Vollmacht.'" Id.
The following Civil Code provision states the primary German rule concern-
ing the creation and legal consequences of authority:
A declaration of intention [Willenserklirung], which an agent makes
in the name of his principal within the scope of a delegated authority,
operates directly both in favor of and as against the principal. It is
immaterial whether the agent's declaration of intention is expressly
made in the name of the principal or from the circumstances it appears
that the agent's intention is to act in the principal's name.
BGB § 164(1). Compare the U.S. definition of authority:
Authority is the power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the
principal by acts done in accordance with the principal's manifestations
of consent to him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1957).
35. This direct agency relationship must be distinguished from "indirect
agency" (mittelbare Vertretung) which arises when the agent agrees to act on
the principal's behalf, but in the agent's name rather than the principal's name.
See BGB § 164(2). See also Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 44. In the
case of direct agency the agent acts "in' the name of his principal .... ." BGB
§ 164(1). Whereas in the case of indirect agency, the indirect agent acts in
his own name.
Compare direct agency under German law with the following RESTATEMENT
Vol. 4
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There are a number of different ways by which a principal
may confer authority upon his agent. For example, according
to the Civil Code a principal may expressly create authority by
performing certain "explicit jural acts" (Rechtsgescfafte). The
acts include: a declaration to either the person who is to exercise
the authority or to the third party; 6 public notification;37 or de-
livering to the agent a written power of agency which the agent
produces for the third party. 8
An agent may also be granted authority as a matter of law.
39
This type of authority is granted primarily for the protection of
a third party who has been led to believe that the agent with
whom he is dealing, has authority even though it was not granted
by an explicit jural act of the principal.4" The conduct of the
(SECOND) OF AGENCY rule concerning the disclosed principal where the principal
is disclosed:
If, at the time of a transaction conducted by an agent, the other party
thereto has notice that the agent is acting for a principal and of the
principal's identity ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(1) (1957). A disclosed principal is
regarded as a party to a contract "made by an agent acting within his author-
ity if made . . . with the understanding that the principal is a party." Id., §
144. See also id., § 147.
Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a con-
tract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become
a party to the contract.
Id., § 320.
36. BGB § 167(1).
37. BGB § 171(1).
38. BGB § 172(1). These particular jural acts are not contracts, but
merely unilateral acts of the principal which are recognized as creating the legal
effect of authority. See Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bfirgerlichen Gesetzbuch
(BGB) § 167, pts. 1-1c (1957) [hereinafter cited as Staudinger]. See also
SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 397-98.
Compare the means of creating authority under the German Civil Code,
notes 36-38 supra, with the U.S. view that:
[A]uthority to do an act can be created by written or spoken words
or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes
the agent to believe that the principal desires him so to act on the
principal's account.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1957). "[T]here must be a mani-
festation by conduct coming from the principal and coming to the knowledge
of the agent." Id., § 26, comment a. For example, "The manifestation of the
principal may consist of his failuire to object to unauthorized conduct." Id.,
§ 26, comment d.
39. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 395. "The general rules dealing with
the 'power of representation' are applicable to powers granted by law as well
as to powers created by a jural act of the principal." Id.
40. See generally Power o1 Agency and Commercial Certainty, supra note
22, at 205. "The law can create the relationship of agency to protect third par-
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principal is the key factor that determines whether an agent has
authority as a matter of law, and if so, the type of such authority.
There are three different types of authority granted by law which
produce, in effect, the same legal consequences as authority cre-
ated by an explicit jural act of the principal. 41  These are called
implied authority (Stillschweigende Bevollmdichtigung), tolerated
authority (Duldungsvollmacht), and apparent authority (An-
scheinsvollmacht).42 In each of these cases it is essential to re-
member that the agent's legal appearance of authorization must
be the cause of the third party's decision to deal with him.
Implied authority is created when the principal shows be-
havior that can be interpreted as an authorization of his agent.4"
It is based on the principal's desire to transact and be bound
when such desire is not made expressly known to the third
party.44 Proof that the principal desired to be bound by his
agent's conduct must be given before a court will hold the former
liable under this type of authority.
45
41. Authority created by an explicit jural act of the principal will be here-
inafter called "express authority" in view of its reasonable, but not identical,
similarity to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY definition of express
authority. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY states that 'To the
extent that [the principal specifies minutely what the agent is to do], the agent
may be said to have express authority." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 7, comment c (1957).
42. See BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRIEBs-BFRATER
1391 (1962).
43. Id.
44. Kropholler, Die Anscheinshaftung im internationalen Recht der Stell-
vertretung, 36 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1641 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Kropholler].
45. See BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRIEBs-BERATER
1391 (1962). See also BGH, Judgment of January 17, 1968, 6 MONATSSCRMIFT
FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 486 (1968), in which the Federal Supreme Court con-
sidered the question of whether the defendant's conduct in loaning out his import
license was equivalent to the granting of implied authority to the user of the
license. The Court held that implied authority was not shown to exist. The
mere conduct of the defendent in loaning out his license was not sufficient proof
of his desire that the user order in his name. According to the Court, the de-
fendant could have expressly mentioned to the user that he did not want the latter
to do so. There was no proof offered to negate this possibility. See also BGH,
Judgment of March 8, 1961, 7 MONATSSCmRFT FOR DEuTscHES RECHT 592-93
(1961), in which the Federal Supreme Court held that before implied authority
can exist, it must be shown that the principal desired to granit authority to the
agent. Both implied authority and tolerated authority cannot be applied after
the principal strictly forbids his agent to act in the principal's behalf and the
agent agrees to comply.
Compare with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY view which states
Vol. 4
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Tolerated authority is a silent declaration of intent (Still-
schweigende Willenserklirung) by one who knows positively
about the conduct of his de facto agent and shows his consent
by failing to do anything that would prevent the appearance of
authority.46
Apparent authority is another form of authority granted by
law which is created when someone acquires the legal appearance
of authorization although, in reality, such individual is unauthor-
ized.47 This type of authority is employed to hold a principal
bound by his de facto agent's activities even though it could not
be shown that the principal knew of such conduct or desired to
be bound by it.4" Proof of apparent authority turns on the third
-that "most authority is created by implication." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 7, comment c (1957). Powers that are described as implied authority
are those which "are all implied or inferred from the words used, from customs
and from the relations of the parties." Id.
46. See BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRiEBS-BERATER
1391 (1962); BGH, Judgment of June 8, 1964, 11 MONATSSCRMlFr FUR
DEUTSCHES RECHT 913 (1964). See generally STAUDINGER, supra note 38, at
pt. 9c. See also OLG K6ln, Judgment of December 11, 1964, 1965 JuRIs-
TISCHE RUNDSCHAU 388.
Compare the following provision of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
which resembles the German law concept of tolerated authority:
In some situations in which silence is maintained, authority (§ 43),
or ratification (§ 94) results, and, if so, liability can be based upon
ordinary agency principles. In situations in which neither authority nor
ratification can be found, there may be liability based upon estoppel
if the other party has changed his position.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B, comment c (1957). "An affirmance
of an unauthorized transaction can be inferred from a failure to repudiate it."
Id., § 94.
47. BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRIEBS-BERATER
1391 (1962).
48. Staudinger, supra note 38, at pt. 9a. "Authority due to legal appear-
ance has the same effects as a legally binding authority." Id. at pt. 9n. For
example, an appearance of authorization can be created by the principal if he
fails to interfere with the actions of his agent when the latter exceeds the scope
of his authority. BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRIEBS-BE-
RATER 1391 (1962). See also OLG Miinchen, Judgment of December 20, 1968,
8. ZS, 8 U 1446/68, in which it was mentioned that as a rule, the legal prin-
ciples of apparent authority are applicable only when unauthorized conduct ex-
tends over a period of time coupled with a certain frequency and permanency
creating an appearance to others that the agent has authority. See generally
BGH, Judgment of October 14, 1968, (1969) WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 43.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY which states: "inhere may
be apparent authority created by the principal's acquiescence in the agent's con-
duct when this is known to the third person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 49, comment b (1957).
For apparent authority to exist, it is not necessary that the principal have
actual knowledge of the agent's unauthorized conduct. BGH, Judgment of No-
1974
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party's reaction to the behavior of the principal. That is, whether
the third party assumed, in his good faith interpretation of the
principal's behavior, that the agent had authority.49 The third
party's decision to contract with the de facto agent must also be
caused by this legal appearance of the agent's authorization;60
not, for example, by a desire to do business solely with the agent.
These related concepts of implied, tolerated, and apparent au-
thority are granted by law to produce identical results. That
is, they make the principal liable for the conduct of his agent
vember 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1391 (1962). The principal cannot
insist on the absence of apparent authority merely with the defense that he was
not aware of the agent's unauthorized conduct. OLG K61n, Judgment of Decem-
ber 11, 1964, 1965 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAu 388.
Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY which states: "Mhe
manifestation and not the intention of the principal is important .... ." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26, comment a (1957). Thus, when appar-
ent authority results from the principal's manifestation to the third person that
the agent is to act on his account, "authority exists although the principal
is not in fact willing that he should do so." Id. See also id., § 27. "Manifes-
tation of consent means conduct from which, in light of the circumstances, it
is reasonable for another to infer consent." Id., § 7, comment b.
The principal will be liable under apparent authority if he could have recog-
nized and prevented a de facto agent's unauthorized conduct by exercising rea-
sonable care. OLG Kdln, Judgment of December 11, 1964, 1965 JURISTISCHE
RUNDSCHAU 388. See also BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BE-
TRIEBs-BERATER 1391 (1962). The principal must be in a position where he
can recognize the conduct of his agent; furthermore, if he has not recognized
it, then it must be assumed that he has acted in a negligent manner. However,
before the principal can be held liable, he must have had the opportunity to
prevent the occurrence of apparent authority. Staudinger, supra note 38, at pts.
9i, 9k. But see BGH, Judgment of March 3, 1966, 11 BETRIEBS-BERATER 425
(1966).
Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY view that, for apparent
authority to arise,
[E]ither the principal must intend to cause the third person to believe
that the agent is authorized to act for him, or he should realize that
his conduct is likely to create such belief.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27, comment a (1957).
49. Staudinger, supra note 38, at pt. 9b.
50. BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1391
(1962). It is essential that the decision of the third party is caused by the
agent's legal appearance before apparent authority will arise. OLG Koln, Judg-
ment of December 11, 1964, 1965 JURISTISCIiE RUNDSCHAU 388. Regarding ap-
parent authority, both the behavior of the so-called principal and the recognition
of this behavior by the third party are in issue. BGH, Judgment of March 8,
1961, 7 MONATssCHRiFT FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 592-93 (1961).
Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY view that "the prin-
cipal is affected by apparent authority only as to those who rely upon conduct
of the principal which causes them to believe that the 'agent' is authorized." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 159, comment b (1957).
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despite his failure to grant authority for such conduct by an ex-
press jural act. 5 It is important to keep in mind the distinctions
between these types of authority while analyzing German cases
involving agency. 2 The courts generally follow the pattern of
initially looking for the existence of tolerated and implied author-
ity; if such cannot be determined, then the courts look to see
if apparent authority can be applied as a means of protecting
the innocent third party in his reliance upon the unauthorized
agent's conduct.
5 3
Whether authority is granted either expressly or by law, it
is strictly distinguished from the internal relationship between the
agent and principal. 54  This relationship may take the form of
an employment contract, service contract, or even mere consent
51. Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY version concerning
the liability of the principal based on the "authorized" acts of the agent:
The liability of the principal to a third person upon a transaction
conducted by an agent, or the transfer of his interests by an agent,
may be based on the fact that: (a) the agent was authorized; (b) the
agent was apparently authorized ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1957).
52. Compare emphasis by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY on dis-
tinctions between the types of authority: "[Apparent authority] is entirely dis-
tinct from authority, either express or implied." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 8, comment a (1957). Authority results from the principal's manifes-
tation of consent to the agent "made by words or other conduct including
acquiescence." Id. § 7, comment c. However,
Apparent authority is created by the same method as that which creates
authority, except that the manifestation of the principal is to the third
person rather than to the agent.
Id., § 27, comment a. However, since
[A]pparent authority is generally inferred or implied from manifesta-
tions of the principal to third persons, . . . it is correct to speak of
implied or inferred apparent authority in most of the situations where
apparent authority exists.
Id., § 8, comment e.
53. See generally BGH, Judgment of March 8, 1961, 7 MONATSSCHRIFT
FUR DEUTsCHEs RECHT 592-93 (1961).
Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY in which the third party
may also be protected by the principle of estoppel. This principle "is essen-
tially a principle in the law of torts developed in order to prevent loss to an
innocent person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment d (1957).
Like apparent authority, it is based on the idea that one should be
bound by what he manifests irrespective of fault; but it operates only
to compensate for loss to those relying upon the words and not to cre-
ate rights in the speaker.
Id. In other words, when the principal has given apparent authority, he can
sue or be sued as a party to his agent's contract with the third party. However,
under estoppel, the principal acquires no rights but he can be sued or held liable
for the third party's change of position in reliance on the principal's manifesta-
tions with respect to the agent's authority. See id., § 8B, comment b.
54. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 50. See Staudinger, supra note
12
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on the part of the agent to act in the name of the principal.55
But whatever form it takes, it does not create authority. Rather,
it confers upon a designated person a limited or defined compe-
tence to act as an agent.56 This independence between authority
and the underlying relationship is often referred to as the "abstract
nature of authority".57
38, at pts. 1-1c. See also SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 395-97 & 412-16. This
distinction arises since:
The independence of authorization from the contract between principal
and agent is justified by the different character of the two transactions
which corresponds to their different functions.
Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty, supra note 22, at 199. Compare
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY which likewise distinguishes between
authority and the contract of agency:
It is not essential to the existence of authority that there be a contract
between the principal or agent or that the agent promise or otherwise
undertake to act as an agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26, comment a (1957). For an agency
relation to exist there need only be a "manifestation of consent by one per-
son to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so to act." Id. § 1 (1). Such a relation can be created
"although neither party receives consideration." Id., § 16.
[W]hether or not the agent is authorized to do a particular act at a
particular time depends, not only on what the principal told the agent,
but upon a great variety of other factors, including changes in the situa-
tion after the instructions were given.
Id., § 33, comment b. Thus, the agent "may or may not contract as to what
he is or is not to do. . . . He may . . . be authorized to do more than he
contracted to do." Id., comment a.
55. See generally STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 52, wherein various forms of
agency relations established by contract are illustrated; for example, those involv-
ing a trade agent (Handelsvertreter), broker (Makler), commission merchant
(Kommissiondir), and others who enter into a contract to supply continuous serv-
ices (Dienstvertrag) or products (Werkvertrag) for the principal. The author
distinguishes between "agency by contract" and "agency by power of attorney."
Id., at 41. The latter type of agency relationship refers Ito the case
[W]hereby one person, the principal, authorizes another, the agent, to
act in his name in dealing with third parties. As long as the agent
acts within his power, the principal is bound by such action.
Id. Agency by power of attorney results in a "power of representation" in the
agent.
56. Staudinger, supra note 38, at pts. 1-1c. See Law of Agency, supra note
11, at 171-72. Furthermore, authority does not create any rights or liabilities
as between the principal and agent. Staudinger, supra note 38, at pts. 1-1c. See
also SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 397-98 and Power of Agency and Commer-
cial Certainty, supra note 22, at 205. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 26, comment a (1957) cited in note 54 supra.
57. See Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 50. The grant of Vollmacht
(authority) is regarded as an abstract transaction because it may have been
"validly granted even though the basic contract between the principal and
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The legal effects arising out of the abstract nature of author-
ity should be carefully examined. Under this concept, contracts
signed by an agent will bind the principal even if the underlying
employment contract between the principal and agent turns out
to be invalid.5" There are instances when the abstract nature
of authority may work to the principal's disadvantage. Suppose,
for example, that the principal, after consistently allowing his
agent to sign contracts without restriction, now wants to place
some limitations on his agent's authority to sign. If the principal
merely adds limiting instructions to the employment contract be-
tween himself and his agent, then the latter's authority to sign,
under ordinary circumstances, remains unrestricted or unaffected
by the limitations in this internal contract. Such being the case,
the agent could violate his employment contract by ignoring the
limitations while, at the same time, acting within the scope of
his authority.59 If the third party learns, however, that the agent
has violated his internal instructions by signing a particular con-
tract, a court will hold that he lacked the requisite good faith reli-
ance upon the agent's authority to sign and refuse to enforce the
contract against the principal. 60 Also, if the third party is held
negligent in failing to discover that the agent violated his princi-
pal's instructions, he will be prohibited from enforcing the con-
tract against the principal. 6 ' Thus, to effectively restrict or de-
fine the scope of an agent's authority, a principal should try to
ensure that any limiting instructions will come to the attention
of a prudent third party prior to the conclusion of the agent-third
party contract.
58. See 1 CoHN, supra note 2, at 88. Accord, Soergel-Siebert, supra note
34, at pt. 50.
59. According to Muller-Freienfels:
[A]n agent may act within the confines of his power, but violate
his duty by not observing his internal instructions. In these cases, a
third person has to be concerned only about the limitations of authority,
but not about the limitations of mandate.
Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty, supra note 22, at 205.
60. See BGB §§ 138, 169, & 179(3). See also BGH, Judgment of Febru-
ary 16, 1967, 1967 WOHNUNGSWIRTSCHAFT UND MIETRECHT IV B 482, in which
the Federal Supreme Court ruled that the principal may refuse to be bound by
a contract entered into by his agent when the third party recognized the agent's
misuse of agency at the time the contract was made.
Compare this German rule with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
view that "the third person must believe the agent to be authorized." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment c (1957).
61. See, e.g., discussion of BGH, Judgment of September 17, 1958, 1
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Looking again at the above example, assume that the agent
had never been given express authority or authority granted by
law to sign a contract with a third party. Completely lacking
any authority, his act of signing it would not bind the principal.
Thus, according to the Civil Code, this unauthorized agent
(machtlose Vertreter) would be the only one against whom the
third party could enforce the contract.6 2  Liability is created in
the unauthorized agent by his breach of what might be called
a lawful warranty of authority.63  If he wishes to avoid this liabil-
ity, he must either prove or obtain authority. 4  He may, in effect,
obtain authority by persuading the principal to ratify the con-
tract. 
5
In the area of commercial transactions there exists a special
agency relationship in which the agent need rarely worry about
exceeding the scope of his authority since it is virtually unlimited.
The expanded authority (Prokura) under this form of agency
helps to expedite commercial affairs by removing the need for
62. See BGB §§ 179(l) & 177(l).
A person purporting to act on behalf of a named principal without au-
thority to do so, is an unauthorized agent. His transactions become
valid through ratification by the principal. . . . If the alleged princi-
pal refuses ratification, the unauthorized agent becomes personally li-
able to the party with whom he contracted, unless that party knew,
or should have known of his lack of authority.
STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 50-51.
63. Palandt, Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 179, pt.
1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Palandt]. Compare this concept of warranty
of authority under German law with that of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY which states that:
A person who purports to make a contract . . . on behalf of another
who has full capacity but whom he has no power to bind, thereby be-
comes subject to liability to the other party thereto upon an implied
warranty of authority, unless he has manifested that he does not make
such warranty or the other party knows that the agent is not so author-
ized.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 329 (1957).
64. Palandt, supra note 63, at pt. 1.
65. See STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 50-51. "If a person enters into a contract
in the name of another without authority, the contract is valid in favour of and
as against the principal only if he ratifies." BGB § 177(1) (translated by WANG,
supra note 4). Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY view on ratifi-
cation. The effect of ratification is that "the principal becomes responsible for
contracts and conveyances made for him by one purporting to act on his account
as if the transaction had been authorized ....... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY 143 (1957). Ratification is
[T]o be distinguished from the situation in which an agent, although
without authority nevertheless binds the principal because he acted
within his apparent authority, scope of employment or other agency
power ...
Id., § 82, comment a.
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the third party to concern himself with subjective factors such
as the limitations on the agent's (Prokurist) authority. 6  Pro-
kura also satisfies the commercial necessity of having the Pro-
kurist act as the "alter ego" of the principal in carrying on a
commercial enterprise. However, the principal who establishes
Prokura, does not have the freedom to control the extent of his





Apparent authority is a powerful tool which a court may
wield to produce, what it believes to be, the most just result in
a given case. It is a logical offspring of the German legal system
which includes equity as ". . . an inherent element of legal
thought. . .. ,,08 The German courts generally apply apparent
66. See Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty, supra note 22, at 208-
09. See generally 2 E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 13-14 (1971) [herein-
after cited as 2 COHN]. "[T]he power of the prokurist has no parallel in the
English and American law ...... STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 46.
67. See HGB §§ 48-53. Some important rules concerning the extent of
Prokura follow: (1) A restriction of the scope of Prokura has no legal effects
with respect to third persons. HGB § 50. In effect, the principal must grant
authority as a whole or not at all. See Power of Agency and Commercial Cer-
tainty, supra note 22, at 208; (2) A Prokurist may alienate or incumber real
property if expressly authorized to do so. HGB § 49(2); (3) A Prokurist may
represent the enterprise in any dealings with third persons, even in judicial pro-
ceedings. Id., § 49(1). See also STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 46; (4) Prokura
may be revoked at any time by the principal. HGB § 52(1); (5) Prokura is
not extinguished by the death of the owner of the mercantile business by whom
it was conferred. Id. § 52(2).
However, the following limitations and requirements exist: (1) In light of
the Prokurist's extraordinary scope of power, his appointment must be entered
"with all details concerning his scope of power, in the Commercial Register
of the court in the district in which the firm is domiciled." STEEFEL, supra
note 6, at 46. See also HGB § 53; (2) Prokurist is not authorized to sell the
enterprise. 2 COHN, supra note 66, at 13. See STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 46;
(3) If the third party is aware of the Prokurist's abuse of authority that is detri-
mental to the principal, then the purported limitations imposed by the principal
on the Prokura are binding on the third party. BGH, Judgment of March 25,
1968, 1968 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1379. See STEEFEL, supra note
6, at 47; (4) Prokura can be conferred only by means of an express declaration.
HGB § 48(1). Thus, it can never be implied. STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 46.
See also Staudinger, supra note 38, at pt. 9r.
68. Private Laws of Western Civilization, supra note 7, at 436. Compare
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authority to prevent a principal from denying that he has given
his agent the authority to do a particular act when the principal's
conduct caused a prudent and good faith third party to believe
that the agent had such authority. The principal is held legally
bound by his agent's act even though the former had not ex-
pressly given authority to the agent; it is sufficient for the princi-
pal's liability that he gave his agent "apparent authority". 69
In deciding whether to hold a principal liable for the acts
of his agent under apparent authority, a court will not confine
itself to merely scrutinizing the conduct of the defendant-princi-
pal. The plaintiff-third party's conduct will also be carefully ex-
amined and must be found free of culpability before the court
will consider ruling in his favor. The following cases illustrate
the manner in which German courts analyze the behavior of the
parties when called upon to decide whether to apply apparent
authority doctrines to hold a principal liable.
B. Judicial Application of Apparent Authority
In a 1968 court of appeals case, the agent (architect) con-
tracted with the principal to assist in the rebuilding of the princi-
pal's house.7" Under the contract, the agent agreed to submit
plans and statistical calculations to the city as required by law.
The principal paid full consideration to the agent for this service
and received a receipt reflecting this fact. A few weeks later,
the agent, allegedly for the principal, ordered the third party to
make plans and statistical calculations according to the agent's
specifications. The agent asked the third party to submit the
plans to the principal for signature and to bill the latter for the
work. The principal signed and returned the plans, but refused
to pay the third party on the grounds that payment for this job
had already been given to the agent.
In refusing to hold the principal liable under apparent au-
thority, the court stated: "The general rule that the third party
should not suffer for trusting in the legal appearance of authority,
finds its counterpart in the regard of the interests of the princi-
In its proper setting, the term [apparent authority] enables the [U.S.]
courts to exercise a kind of business equity as they have been enabled
to do by the use of the term 'scope of employment.'
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment f (1957).
69. For a discussion of the general principles of apparent authority, see
notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
70. QLG Miinchen, Judgment of December 20, 1968, 8. ZS, 8 U 1446/68.
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pal."'7' The court went on to state that if the principal recog-
nized or could have recognized that the agent was exceeding his
authority, then the interests of the third party might be held to
a higher esteem than the interests of the principal. The third
party's request that the principal sign the plans was not sufficient
to give the principal notice of the agent's unauthorized conduct
since the principal had assumed that the agent had already been
fully paid for the job. Also, the principal's single act of signing
the plans was not of a frequency and permanency sufficient to
lead a prudent third party to believe that the agent had author-
ity.
The fundamental rule expressed by this case is that the Ger-
man court, in keeping with its duty to combine law with equity,
will balance the interests of both the principal and third party
before deciding liability under apparent authority. While weigh-
ing the interests of both sides, the court will observe all the cir-
cumstances to determine whether the third party is permitted to
rely in good faith upon a contract made with an unauthorized
agent.72 Accordingly, the third party will not only be required
to satisfy the court that he acted in good faith,73 but he must
also show that his reliance was justified. 7
4
71. Id.
72. BGH, Judgment of March 25, 1964, 7 MONATSSCURIFT FOR DEurscms
REcHT 592.
73. See BGB §§ 138, 169, 178, & 179(3).
If the agent misuses agency in an obvious way, causing the third party
to doubt that the agent's good faith was involved, then the principal
is protected against such misuse of agency.
BGH, Judgment of February 28, 1966, 1966 ZEITSCmrIFT FUR DAS NOTARiAT IN
BADEN-WiORTTEMBERG 338(L). This is especially true when the circumstances
demand that the third party confirm the agent's authority with the principal.
Id. See also Staudinger, supra note 38, at pt. 9f, where it is noted that the
third party's interpretation of the agent's conduct must include the belief that
any unauthorized acts would be recognized by the principal, as long as the latter
applied due care.
Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY in which it is stated that
"apparent authority exists only as to those who learn of a manifestation from
conduct of the principal for which he is responsible." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF AGENCY § 27, comment b (1957).
74. See BGH, Judgment of January 17, 1968, 6 MONATSSCHmFT FRm
DEuTscHns RECHT 486 (1968), in which the Federal Supreme Court points out:
The third party is protected if he trusted in the legal appearance and
did not know, or could not find out by applying reasonable care, that
the agent was unauthorized.
Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY which mentions that "Ap-
parent authority exists only to the extent that it is reasonable for the third per-
son dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is authorized." RESTATE-
1974
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This court implied that even if the third party could prove
that he justifiably relied upon the agent's authority, he might nev-
ertheless fail to recover so long as the principal is totally free
from culpability. In other words, if a principal, in the exercise
of reasonable care, could not have discovered and prevented his
agent's unauthorized activity, then he will not be held liable to
a third party. This view has been supported by a Federal Su-
preme Court decision. 75 However, the Federal Supreme Court
has held to the contrary when a general agent forged a principal's
signature to mislead an innocent third party.76
If it can be shown that a third party was negligent in failing
to recognize an agent's misuse of his authority, then a principal
will generally not be bound by a contract entered into by his
agent." Whether a third party has been negligent in believing
the existence of an agent's authority, is largely based on the kind
of contract at issue. In a case involving the lease of a petrol
station, the third party (lessee) relied upon the apparent author-
ity of the principal's (owner) agent with respect to a lease con-
tract.7" The Federal Supreme Court held that apparent authority
was not established since the third party was negligent in relying
upon the agent's authority without verifying it with the principal.
It was mentioned that the need to accept the agent's authority
without verification would have been created if inquiring of the
so-called principal or requiring authorization in writing would have
delayed or even prevented the transaction. Such was not the case
here since the lease involved a substantial amount of preparation
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, comment c (1957).
A person with notice of a limitation of an agent's authority cannot sub-
ject the principal to liability upon a transaction with the agent if he
should know that the agent is acting improperly.
Id., § 166. "A person has notice of a fact if he knows the fact, has reason
to know it, should know it, or has been given notification of it." Id., § 9(1).
The words 'should know' express the idea that . . . a person is required
to ascertain what would be ascertained by a person of ordinary intelli-
gence exercising ordinary care in the protection of his own interests
Id., § 9, comment e.
75. BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1391
(1962). See Staudinger, note 38 supra, at pt. 9k. See also Enneccerus-Nipperdey,
Bfirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (BGB) Allgemeiner Teil § 184, 1134 (1960) [herein-
after cited as Enneccerus-Nipperdey].
76. BGH, Judgment of March 3, 1966, 11 BETRIEBS-BERATER 425 (1966).
77. BGH, Judgment of March 25, 1964, 7 MONATSSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES
REcwr 592.
78. BGH, Judgment of September 17, 1958, 1 MONATSSC[RIFT FUR
DEUTSCHEs RECHT 30 (1959).
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which allowed the third party time to inquire into the agent's
authority without jeopardizing the transaction. Also, the exercise
of due care with respect to such an important transaction called
for a verification by the third party.
79
The third party may also show that he considered custom
when he made his good faith reliance on the agent's legal appear-
ance. 0 A determination of what constitutes custom may be diffi-
cult. In a case where the agent (salesman) was authorized to
sell cranes for the principal, the lower court held that, according
to custom, the agent was also authorized to purchase parts for
cranes. The Federal Supreme Court disagreed and held that the
sale of cranes and the purchase of parts for the cranes were not
Comparable.8 ' Purchasing parts is a totally different job from
that for which the agent had been hired.82 The Court proceeded
to mention that the third party could have prevailed in his conten-
tion that the agent had apparent authority by showing that he
relied on a general or public belief that the agent's job included
the authority to purchase parts for cranes."3 Such evidence was
never offered, nor was there evidence showing that the agent
had purchased parts in the past. 84 Thus, the position of the agent
79. Id.
80. See OLG K8ln, Judgment of December 11, 1964, 1965 JurilscnscH
RUNDSCHAU 388. See also Staudinger, supra note 38, at pt. 9h, illustrating that
for a legal appearance to arise, the kind of transaction in which the agent is
involved in must not be too unusual for his customary line of business. Accord,
Kropholler, supra note 44, at 1641.
81. BGH, Judgment of June 8, 1964, 11 MONATSSCHRIFT FUR DEUTSCHES
RECHT 913 (1964).
82. Id. Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY provisions on
interpretation of authority:
An authorization is interpreted in light of all accompanying circum-
stances, including among other matters: (a) the situation of the par-
ties, their relations to one another, and the business in which they are
engaged; (b) the general usages of business, the usages of trades or
employments of the kind to which the authorization relates, and the
business methods of the principal ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34 (1957).
83. BGH, Judgment of June 8, 1964, 11 MONATSSCI-RFT FOR DEuTscHas
RECHT 913 (1964). Compare the German rule concerning the effect of public
belief on the creation of apparent authority with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY counterpart:
[A] person who permits another to do an act in such a way as to
establish in a community a reputation for having authority to act, either
by directing the agent so to represent, or by directing him to act and
doing nothing to prevent the spread of such information by the agent
or by others, creates apparent authority with respect to those who learn
of the reputation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27, comment a (1957).
84. Compare the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY view which might
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as a salesman of cranes did not create a legal appearance of au-
thority to purchase crane parts.s5 There was no wrongdoing by
the principal in this matter since he was under the impression
that his agent was to merely prepare negotiations and not to ex-
ceed his authority by making final orders. Neither the princi-
pal's failure to clarify his agent's scope of authority nor his act
of referring the third party to his agent should create liability.
Even if a plaintiff, whether a third party or principal, earns
the right to recover, a court will generally make certain that he
does not obtain a bargain from the lawsuit by profiting from dou-
ble liability. The issue of double liability arose where a third
party brought suit against an unauthorized agent rather than the
principal even though the latter's liability had already been estab-
lished under apparent authority. 86 Suit was brought under a sec-
tion of the Civil Code which provided that the unauthorized agent
may be held personally liable to the party with whom he con-
tracted if the principal refuses to ratify the contract.8 7  The court
of appeals held that liability of the principal under apparent au-
apply if such evidence was presented in an American court: "Acquiescence by
the principal in a series of acts by the agent indicates authorization to perform
similar acts in the future." Id., § 43(2). See also id., § 27 comment a.
85. BGH, Judgment of June 8, 1964, 11 MONATSSCImIFT FUR DEUTSCHES
RECHT 913 (1964). See generally Staudinger, supra note 38, at pt. 9i, which
indicates that some commentators believe that a legal appearance will arise if
the agent is placed in the legal circle of the principal, such as his factory or
place of business, and the principal neglects to do something to prevent an ap-
pearance of authority. Compare with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY:
[Aipparent authority can be created by appointing a person to a posi-
tion . . . which carries with it generally recognized duties; to those who
know of the appointment there is apparent authority to do the things
ordinarily entrusted to one occupying such a position, regardless of un-
known limitations which are imposed upon the particular agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27, comment a (1957).
86. OLG Hamm, October 27, 1970, 12 JURISTSCHE SCHULUNG 655 (1971).
87. See BGB § 179(1) which states:
A person who has entered into a contract as an agent is, if he has
not given proof of his authority, bound to the other party at his election
either to carry out the contract or to compensate him, if the principal
refuses to ratify the contract.
BGB § 179(1) (translated by WANG, supra note 4). See also BGB § 179(2)
which provides that:
An agent, who is without knowledge that he lacks authority, is still
liable for the damage the third party has sustained by relying on the
agent's authority. However, the innocent agent's liability does not ex-
tend beyond the value of the interest which the third party has in the
validity of the contract.
BGB § 179(2) (translated by WANG, supra note 4). When the agent errone-
ously believes in the existence of his agency, he is liable according to BGB § 179
only for immediate damages. Kropholier, supra note 44, at 1641. See generally
notes 62 & 65 supra and accompanying text.
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thority excluded the liability of the agent. It was reasoned that
to allow an action by the third party against the agent under these
circumstances would amount to a double liability; the third party
did not need this much protection. In fact, if suit was permitted
against the agent, the third party would have been placed in a
better position than a third party who dealt with an agent of ordi-
nary authority. An action against the principal, however, avoids
this unfair enrichment arising from double liability. Further-
more, even after being held liable for his agent's apparent author-
ity, the principal is partially protected at the expense of the agent
since he is normally given the right to seek indemnification from
the latter.
Double liability was again at issue in a Federal Supreme
Court case arising in connection with a suit brought by a principal
against a third party."8 The Court's decision illustrates a signifi-
cant exception to the general rules of apparent authority. Here
the agent (an attorney) had impersonated the principal by forg-
ing his name, thereby causing a third party (bank) to give the
principal's money to the agent without the knowledge or consent
of the principal. When the principal failed to receive his money,
he brought suit against the third party. The principal argued
that the attorney was without any authority to collect the money
from the third party; s9 therefore the third party's obligation was
still not satisfied.
This argument was rejected by the court because it sub-
jected the innocent third party to the risk of double liability, in
that should the attorney not be located, the third party's right to
bring suit to recover the funds would be worthless.90 Thus,
guided by its duty to protect the interests of the innocent third
party, the Court applied the tool of apparent authority to hold
that the obligation to the principal was fulfilled once the attorney-
agent was paid. The Court supported its holding by pointing
88. BGH, Judgment of March 3, 1966, 11 BETRIEBS-BERATER 425 (1966).
89. See BGB §§ 177 & 179. If the agent enters into a contract with a
third party with neither real nor apparent authority, then the third party cannot
hold the principal liable under this contract as long as the principal refuses to
ratify it. BGB § 177. However, the third party may elect to either seek com-
pensation from the unauthorized agent or hold him bound by this contract. See
BGB § 179(1). This relief granted to the third party under the Civil Code
will be denied if he knew or ought to have known of the absence of the agent's
authority. See BGB § 179(3).
90. See BGB § 179(1).
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out that the general agency provision of the Civil Code,9 upon
which apparent authority is based, was applicable due to the ex-
istence of an actual principal-agent relationship between the
plaintiff and the attorney. It was immaterial that the attorney
did not desire to act as an agent at the time he forged the princi-
pal's signature. Moreover, the Court relied upon the fact that
the third party intended to do business with the principal and
not with the attorney.
The rule expressed by this recent Federal Supreme Court
decision is that if an individual having a power of agency, con-
ducts a transaction in his principal's name in order to mislead the
third party as to the agent's true identity, then the general agency
provision of the Civil Code is applicable. Therefore, a principal
is responsible for the conduct of his agent where the third party
intended to do business with the principal, not his agent.92
This decision establishes what might be deemed an exception
to the general rule which requires that the principal, in his exercise
of due care, should have an opportunity to prevent the creation of
apparent authority before being held responsible for the agent's un-
authorized acts. 93  Inasmuch as forgery, by its very nature, appears
to be a difficult crime to recognize and prevent, the principal might
not have an opportunity to prevent the third party from being misled
as to the validity of the agent's authority in spite of the exercise of
due care on the principal's part. On the other hand, it also
follows that the third party might not have an opportunity to pro-
tect himself by discovering the forgery in spite of his exercise
of due care.
This case may be contrasted with the more usual one in which
91. See BGB § 164(1).
92. See generally Reichsgericht (RG) [German Supreme Court prior to
end of World War II, now entitled Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)], Judgment of
April 16, 1937, 19 HbCHSTRICHTERLICHE RECHTSPRECHUNG pt. 1296 (1937), in
which the Supreme Court held that a principal's liability can result from legal
appearance, even when the agent forges the signature of the principal. Contra,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY:
Anyone who has relied upon appearances for which the principal is
responsible can acquire rights against the principal by dealing with an
unauthorized agent. On the other hand, others who do not know of
manifestations for which the principal is in some manner responsible
acquire no rights against the principal because of apparent authority.
• . . This is true although they are reasonable in believing the agent
to be authorized, as where they rely upon a skillful forgery. ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 159 comment b (1957).
93. Staudinger, supra note 38, at pt. 9k. See note 48 supra. See also
BGH, Judgment of November 5, 1962, 35/36 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1391 (1962).
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the agent merely exceeds the scope of his authority. In this in-
stance, the third party generally has the opportunity to protect
himself by inquiring of the principal as to the true scope of the
agent's authority. Such opportunity does not arise when forgery,
of the kind discussed in the Federal Supreme Court's decision,
is involved since the third party is led to believe that he is actually
dealing with the principal. Thus, the responsibility for the
agent's act, with respect to the special case of forgery, must lie
with the principal in order to provide the third party protection
under German law.
Further support for this decision may be found in the argument
that, in the case of forgery by the agent, it is only reasonable
that the third party should not be made to suffer a loss on the
transaction when the principal selected the wrongdoer to act for
him as a general agent. Responsibility for this loss should, in
all fairness, be attributed to the principal based on his failure
to employ an agent of higher moral character.
94
As shown in the above cases, the German courts will not rigid-
ly apply apparent authority for the protection of a third party when
he fails to prove a prudent and good faith reliance on the agent's
authority. However, if the third party's non-culpability can be
demonstrated then the courts will insure that his interests are pro-
tected. Likewise, the courts usually protect the interests of
the innocent third party when called upon to decide cases involv-
ing an undisclosed principal.
IV. THE UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL RELATIONSHIP:
INDIRECT AGENCY
A. General Rule
There are a number of occasions for which an agent may
be employed to act in his own name, but pursuant to the instruc-
tions of a principal. A principal may, for example, hire such
an agent, or so-called "indirect agent", to contract with a third
party when the principal is forbidden by a legal barrier95 or lacks
94. See generally BGH, Judgment of February 28, 1966, 1966 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR DAS NOTARIAT in Baden-Wurttemberg 338(L) in which the Federal Supreme
Court indicated that the principal, as a general rule, must bear the risk of a
misuse of agency.
95. For example, an individual may wish to purchase certain goods, but
lacks the required license. He may hire another who owns such a license to
purchase the goods for him.
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the legal capacity96 to contract with this particular third party
in his own name. More commonly, for reasons of convenience,
the principal might wish to buy, sell,97 or transport goods98 or
generally transact business99 with the help of an indirect agent.
Since an indirect agent acts in his own name, the principal's
identity is generally not disclosed to the third party at the time
the indirect agent concludes a contract. German law demon-
strates considerable concern for the interests of this third party
by holding that the undisclosed principal will not acquire any
rights nor incur liabilities "directly" from such a contract con-
cluded by his indirect agent.' 0 In this fashion, the third party
is effectively protected from a stranger's (undisclosed principal)
attempt to enforce a contract against him when this person was
not named as a party to the contract. Only the indirect agent,
as a named party to the contract, has the right to enforce it
against the third party.1 1 Conversely, the third party may only
96. For example, a minor might wish to obtain the benefits from a certain
contractual relationship. To do so, he may ask an indirect agent (such as an
adult relative) to contract for him.
97. For example, the principal may hire a so-called strawman or a com-
mission merchant to buy or sell goods for him.
The strawman is an indirect agent who is employed by an undisclosed
principal to buy and sell when the latter cannot, or does not want to,
accomplish such purpose by acting in his own person.
Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 48. Additionally:
A commission merchant is one who, in the regular course of his trade,
buys or sells goods or negotiable instruments in his own name, but upon
the instructions of another person [the principal].
HGB § 383 (translated by SCHUSTER, supra note 5).
98. The principal may hire a forwarding agent (Spediteur).
A forwarding agent is a person who in the regular course of his trade
undertakes the forwarding of goods by the agency of carriers by land
or sea in his own name but upon the instructions of another.
HGB § 407 (translated by SCHUSTER, supra note 5).
99. For this purpose, the principal may hire a trade agent.
A trade agent (Handelsvertreter) is an independent self-employed mer-
chant who is permanently engaged to transact business for one or more
firms, either as an intermediary or in the firm's name. . . . His con-
tract with the principal firm is a service contract ...
STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 54. See HGB § 84.
100. The general rule concerning indirect agency is that:
If the agent's intent to act in the name of another is not disclosed,
then the agent alone acquires rights and is exclusively personally liable.
It is immaterial whether the agent actually intends to act for himself
or for another.
BGB § 164(2). See generally Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 44.
101. See BGB § 164(2). See generally Mtiller-Freienfels, Comparative As-
pects of Undisclosed Agency, 18 MoD. L. REV. 33, 36 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Comparative Aspects of Undisclosed Agency]. See also Soergel-Siebert, supra
note 34, at pt. 44,
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enforce it against the indirect agent and not the undisclosed prin-
cipal. 10 2 Thus, the undisclosed principal-indirect agent relation-
ship, or so-called "indirect agency" situation, is not a true or "di-
rect agency" relationship under German law. 03
102. The undisclosed principal is treated like a stranger to his indirect
agent's contracts with other parties and will not be legally bound by such con-
tracts until the agent transfers their legal effects to him. See Soergel-Siebert,
supra note 34, at pt. 44.
103. Id. See generally Law of Agency, supra note 11, at 178.
Compare the German law treatment of indirect agency with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY provisions concerning the undisclosed principal. The RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY generally allows the ordinary principles of
agency to govern an undisclosed principal relationship by creating rights and lia-
bilities between the third party and the undisclosed principal "as if the latter
were a contracting party." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 186, com-
ment a (1957). "An undisclosed principal is bound by contracts and convey-
ances made on his account by an agent acting within his authority .... ." d.,
§ 186. However, even if the agent violates the principal's orders, the principal
will still be bound by such contracts if the agent's acts were "usual or neces-
sary in such transaction .... ." d., § 194. In effect, "the principal be-
comes a party to the contract by operation of law .... ." Id., § 186, comment
a. There are certain limitations on the right of the third party to hold the un-
disclosed principal bound by the contract. For example, "the principal is not
bound by a contract which is under seal or which is negotiable, or upon a con-
tract which excludes him." Id., § 186. Also, it must be proven that "the
agent intended to act upon [the principal's] account." Id., § 186, comment c.
If conversely, the undisclosed principal wishes to step in and sue the third
party on the contract, then, under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, he
may do so since, "subject to [certain] equitable defenses, the undisclosed princi-
pal is given the normal rights of a disclosed principal to maintain an action
at law." Id., § 186, comment a. See also id., § 302. However, the undisclosed
principal cannot hold the third party liable on the contract if the former "is
excluded by the form or terms of the contract, . . . his existence is fraudulently
concealed or . . . there is set-off or a similar defense against the agent." Id.,
§ 302.
In spite of the difference between the U.S. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY provisions and the basic German law on indirect agency, both views
tend to converge in a particular area. The agent of an undisclosed principal
is treated by both the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY and German law
as being a party to the agent-third party contract. See id., § 322. See BGB
§ 164(2). However, since the undisclosed principal and the agent are held to
be parties to the contract under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, the
American third party plaintiff is in a more favorable position than his German
counterpart who can only seek a remedy against the indirect agent. The third
party plaintiff under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY may elect, follow-
ing disclosure of the agency, to hold either the principal or the agent liable on
the contract, but not both. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 186, com-
ments a & b, 210(1) & 210(2) (1957). See id., § 210A comments a & b. "[Ulf
[the third person] obtains judgment against the agent with no knowledge of the
identity of the principal, he can later get judgment against the principal." Id.,
§§ 186, comment a, & 210(2).
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As a result, property acquired by the indirect agent in his
own name, but in accordance with his principal's instructions, is
regarded as property belonging to the indirect agent. Such being
the case, as long as the principal's property remains in the posses-
sion of the indirect agent, it may be lost to the latter's creditors. 10 4
Thus, a debt accruing to the undisclosed principal but collected
by another who is acting as an indirect agent under the direction
of the undisclosed principal, is subject to attachment by the per-
sonal creditors of the indirect agent.0 5 Even those claims which
an indirect agent may have against his undisclosed principal, such
as for reimbursement, are subject to attachment.' 06 On the other
hand, if the principal wishes to prevent his own creditors from
reaching assets due him from another party, he may employ an
indirect agent to prevent such action by allowing the latter to
continue to hold the property and act as the principal to whom
such assets were due.10 7
B. Judicial Treatment of the Undisclosed
Principal Relationship
After concluding contracts under the instruction of his prin-
cipal, there are times when the indirect agent may wish to avoid
liabilities or exercise the rights which ordinarily accrue to him
under the law of indirect agency. These situations are illustrated
in the cases below.
In a 1971 court of appeals case, a third party brought suit
against an indirect agent in an effort to recover payment for serv-
ices rendered. 10 8 The indirect agent defended by arguing that
the third party knew, at the time the transaction was entered into,
that he was acting as an indirect agent for an existing principal.
Accordingly, he argued, since the agency relationship was fully
disclosed, the third party should not be allowed to hold him liable
as an indirect agent, but rather, the third party should only be
104. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 44.
105. See id.
106. See id., at pt. 49, in which it was asserted that the creditors of the
indirect agent (strawman) may attach the strawman's claims against the prinici-
pal. See OLG Celle, Judgment of March 22, 1938, 25 JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
scHRIFT 1591 (1938).
107. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 44.
108. OLG Hamburg, Judgment of November 11, 1971, 3 MONATSSCHRIFT
FtR DEUTSCHES RECHT 237 (1972). In this case, the indirect agent was a
strawman. The definition of a strawman is found in note 97 supra.
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allowed to sue the principal under the rules of direct agency.10 9
The court rejected this argument and ruled that the third party's
knowledge of the agency relationship could not be held against
him since the indirect agent did not act as an agent with respect
to the third party, but acted in his own name. The court rea-
soned that transactions by the indirect agent were not apparent
transactions, but real ones; thus, they must be honored by the
indirect agent regardless of the inner relationship between him-
self and his principal.110
A contrasting point of view was presented in a decision
where the indirect agent bought land in her own name using
money furnished by the undisclosed principal (daughter of the
indirect agent)."' There was a loss on the transaction caused
by the third party (defendant-attorney). The problem confront-
ing the court was whether the indirect agent, contracting in her
own name for someone else, could sue for recovery of damages
even though the real injured party was the undisclosed principal.
This question was answered in the affirmative by the court.
Both of the above cases appear consistent in following the
rule that the court will refuse to look beyond the indirect agent
to the real principal in a suit brought by either the third party
or the indirect agent." 2  Even if the third party is aware of the
principal's actual identity or that the person with whom he is deal-
ing is an agent, the court will strictly hold that the principal can
acquire neither rights nor liabilities under his indirect agent's con-
tracts as long as the latter acted in his own name. 1 3  An ex-
109. See generally BGB § 164(1).
110. But see Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 49, noting that a strawman
is to be treated as a direct agent under BGB § 117 when a third party wanted
to transact with the principal and not with the strawman when the strawman's
position was recognized and accepted by the third party.
Compare the court's reasoning in this case with the basic principle of es-
toppel under American law. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, estoppel works "by preventing the one against whom it operates from
pleading the truth." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B, comment a
(1957).
The rule followed by the court in the above case resembled estoppel since
the court prevented the strawman from pleading that he was actually an agent
after he had passed himself off as a sole party or principal with respect to the
contract.
111. OLG Naumburg, Judgment of November 30, 1926, 1927 JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1144.
112. See BGB § 164(2).
113. As demonstrated by the cases in the text accompanying notes 108-11
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ception to this rule is created when the undisclosed principal em-
ploys an indirect agent to accomplish a purpose which is ulti-
mately illegal. In such case, the courts will reach past the indi-
rect agent to hold the undisclosed principal liable for his wrongful
acts.
114
C. Limitations and Exceptions to the General Rule
of Indirect Agency
The basic rule of indirect agency, which prevents the undis-
closed principal from acquiring any rights or liabilities under his
indirect agent's transactions, can operate harshly upon both the
undisclosed principal and indirect agent. As previously shown,
the undisclosed principal must suffer the risk of losing his prop-
erty to his indirect agent's creditors. 11 On the other hand, the
indirect agent must suffer the risk of liability to the third party
for transactions entered into under the direction of the undis-
closed principal." 6  It is possible to minimize such risks or even
produce direct agency effects by following certain procedures.
Some are mentioned below:
1. Limitations to the General Rule.-A few methods
supra, the German courts treat the principal of an indirect agent as a stranger
to his agent's contracts. It is immaterial that the agency relationship is disclosed
or undisclosed with respect to the third party.
Compare this German rule with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
provisions regarding the undisclosed principal and the partially disclosed princi-
pal: "If the other party has no notice that the agent is acting for a principal,
the one for whom he acts is an undisclosed principal." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 4(3) (1957). However, the principal is partially disclosed when
the third party "has notice that the agent is or may be acting for a principal
but has no notice of the principal's identity .... ." Id., § 4(2). Regardless of
whether the principal might, under the circumstances, be classified as a partially
disclosed or undisclosed principal, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
would hold both the principal and agent liable as parties to the third party-agent
contract. See id., § 144 (liability of partially disclosed principal to third per-
son); § 292 (liability of third person to partially disclosed principal); § 186
(liability of undisclosed principal to third person); § 302 (liability of third per-
son to undisclosed principal); § 321 (agent for partially disclosed principal a
party to the contract); and § 322 (agent for undisclosed principal a party to
the contract) (1957).
114. See BGH, Judgment (Beschluss) of December 16, 1963, GSST 1/63
(LG Hof), in which the defendant used strawmen to personally gain ownership
of a quantity of stock which was greater than that authorized by law for one
individual. The Federal Supreme Court held the principal liable for fraud and
obtaining an illegal capital gain.
115. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra.
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have been established to minimize or shorten the time in which
the undisclosed principal risks his assets to the claims of his indi-
rect agent's creditors. One method (antizipiertes Besitzkonsti-
tut)1 7 involves an arrangement between the principal and agent
with respect to property acquisition. Under this arrangement,
both parties agree in advance that certain property is to be trans-
ferred to the principal the minute the agent acquires it.
11 s  Of
course, the agreement must still be in effect at the time the agent
receives title to the property."19 The other method also involves
an arrangement between the principal and agent (Selbstkontra-
hieren). But here, the indirect agent, upon receiving title to
the property, transfers it to himself in his capacity as agent for
the principal. 2 °
It should be remembered that employment of the above
methods serves only to transfer title (Durchgangseigentum) from
the agent to the undisclosed principal. Prior to such transfer,
the indirect agent is still regarded as the true owner of the prop-
erty according to the rules of indirect agency. 12' Therefore,
these methods do not produce the legal effects of a direct agency
relationship, under which, title would vest immediately in the
principal as soon as the property is acquired by his agent. They
merely serve to minimize the risk to the undisclosed principal
arising under the indirect agency concept.
German trade law also provides special rules for shortening
the risk time of a principal who hires a commission merchant
(Kommissioniir) . 122 Under the Commercial Code, all claims
arising out of transactions concluded by a commission merchant
are deemed to be vested in the principal as against any creditor
of the commission merchant. 23 Prior to assignment by the com-
117. BGB § 930.
118. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 46.
119. Id.
120. BGB § 181.
121. See BGB § 164(2). See generally Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at
pt. 46.
122. "These are special rules which cannot be applied in all cases of indirect
agency." Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 45. See generally HGB § 383-
406. For a definition of commission merchant under German law, see note 97
supra.
123. HGB § 392(2). See Comparative Aspects of Undisclosed Agency, su-
pra note 101, at 36. See also Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 45. Subject
to the exceptions mentioned in the text concerning the commission merchant,
the rules of indirect agency normally apply to his transactions with others since
he contracts in his own name. See BGB § 164(2). For example, he remains
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mission merchant to the principal of any rights acquired under
the commission merchant's transactions with others (third par-
ties), the principal does not incur the risk of losing his rights
to the creditors of the commission merchant. The Commercial
Code also protects the principal against the commission merchant
by allowing the principal to demand, at any time, an assignment
of the rights under the transaction in accordance with the terms
of the commission agreement.
124
2. Transactions Which Produce Direct Agency Effects:
Exceptions to the General Rule.-There are certain legal transac-
tions under German law which have remained outside the scope
of indirect agency.' 25  These transactions give rise to direct
agency effects 120 even though the principal remains unidentified.
They fall under the concept of "to whom it may concern. '"127
If the agent acts "for whom it may concern," then he is not held
personally liable on the contract if he acts for a real principal
or is able to nominate one who will accept such a position.
128
A leading commentary has divided this concept into two dis-
tinct categories. 29 Under the first category, entitled "unechte
Fille ffir den den es angeht" (the false cases of to whom it
may concern), it was noted that the agency relationship itself is
disclosed, but the identification of the principal remains undis-
closed.'3 0  In this case, there is mutual consent between the
agent and third party that the principal will be named at a later
date; in fact, the agent may name himself as the future princi-
pal.' Direct agency results from this relationship since the
principle of openness or frankness has been satisfied and the le-
personally liable under his transactions with others and the principal does not
derive any rights out of such transactions until they are assigned to him in ac-
cordance with the commission agreement. STEEFEL, supra note 6, at 62.
124. HGB § 392(1). See generally STEEFEL, supra note 6.
125. See § 164(2).
126. See § 164(1).
127. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pts. 31-33. See generally Law of
Agency, supra note I1, at 177.
128. 1 CoH'N, supra note 2, at 87.
129. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pts. 31-43.
130. Id., at pts. 32-35. Compare this "undisclosed principal" with the "par-
tially disclosed principal" under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(2)
(1957). For the definition and discussion of "partially disclosed principal," see
note 113 supra.
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gal effects of the transaction fall upon the future principal to be
identified or determined.
13 2
Under the second category, entitled "echte Falle ffir den,
den es angeht" (the true cases of to whom it may concern), it
was observed that the third party is not informed that the person
he is dealing with is acting in his own or in somebody else's
name. 133  Here, the agency relationship, as well as the identifica-
tion of the principal, remains undisclosed. 34  The protective
function of full disclosure is regarded as superfluous since in this
instance the third party is totally indifferent as to the identity
of the opposite contracting party. 3 5  Thus, direct agency effects
attach immediately providing the undisclosed principal all the
rights and liabilities under his indirect agent's contract with the third
party.1
3 6
Normally, ordinary business transactions involving cash fall
within this category.' 37  Credit or more important transactions
might also be handled this way under special circumstances. In
such cases, however, it is difficult to substantiate the assumption
that the third party, presumably unaware of the principal's identity,
is also indifferent to it since it is reasonable to expect that he would
be very concerned about the financial standing of the contracting
party to whom he is extending credit.'
V. ASSESSMENT
The purpose of this Comment is to provide a brief overall
view, rather than a comprehensive analysis, of the significant
rules concerning apparent authority and indirect agency (undis-
closed principal) under German law. Its focus is on the standard
of care expected of one who employs the services of an agent
to conduct business in Germany on behalf of a principal.
Generally, German law holds a principal to a high standard
132. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 33. This view permits the agent
of a partially disclosed principal to transform himself into a direct agent at a
later date.
133. Id., at pts. 37-43.
134. Id., at pt. 37. Compare this "undisclosed principal" with the "undis-
closed principal" under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 4(3) (1957).
For the definition and discussion of "undisclosed principal," see note 103 supra.
135. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 37.
136. Id. See BGB § 164(1).
137. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pt. 41. See Law of Agency, supra
note 11, at 177.
138. Soergel-Siebert, supra note 34, at pts. 41, 42.
32
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1974], Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol4/iss2/11
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JouRNAL
of care to prevent a third party from being misled in his belief
that an agent has acquired or has not acquired authority. If the
principal, for example, wishes to restrict the authority of his agent,
he should communicate any limiting instructions to the third party
as well as to the agent. Otherwise he may find himself liable for
acts of his agent which violate these instructions. Such liability will
be based customarily on the rationale that secret limitations cannot
effectively restrict the scope of an agent's authority. Also, should
the principal fail to grant his agent express authority, but never-
theless behave in such a way as to lead the third party to believe
that his agent has proper authority, then the courts may protect
the third party by finding that the agent has apparent authority
as a matter of law.
In applying the principles of apparent authority, the courts
have not ignored fairness and equity in the search for third party
protection. They weigh the interests of the defendant-principal
against the interests of the plaintiff-third party. In doing this,
the courts will refuse to allow recovery against the principal if
it can be shown that the third party lacked good faith or that
he negligently failed to recognize the agent's abuse of his author-
ity. The third party must therefore demonstrate that his reliance
upon the agent's authority was fully justified. Furthermore, the
courts will prevent the third party from leaving the court with a
judgment that exceeds his original expectations of profit under the
contract. The threat of double liability, therefore, has a significant
effect upon the final judgment.
The laws regulating indirect agency are also oriented toward
the protection of the third party. However, here the third party
is assured that he will not find himself liable under his contracts
to others who have not been named as parties to such contracts.
This assurance is provided by German law's refusal to recognize
the undisclosed principal-indirect agent relationship as agency.
Accordingly, the indirect agent, not the undisclosed principal, is
regarded as a party to the contracts concluded by the former.
The rule of indirect agency is rigidly applied by the courts even
where it can be shown that, at the time the contract was con-
cluded, the third party had knowledge that his contracting partner
was an indirect agent, acting upon the instructions of a principal.
The primary disadvantage suffered by the undisclosed prin-
cipal, or partially disclosed principal, is that his assets are subject
to the risk of attachment by the indirect agent's creditors while
Vol. 4
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in the agent's possession. There remain various methods in
which the undisclosed principal can minimize this risk. For ex-
ample, both the undisclosed principal and indirect agent can
agree in advance to have the title of the property transferred
to the undisclosed principal as soon as the indirect agent acquires
it. Although a small time lag still exists between the acquisition
of title by the indirect agent and its transfer to the undisclosed
principal, the undisclosed principal's risk is kept to a minimum.
On the other hand, actual direct agency effects, for and against
the undisclosed principal, may be allowed under the concept of "to
whom it may concern" if the third party is totally indifferent as to
the identity of his opposite contracting partner. In this instance the
protection offered the third party under the rule of indirect
agency is unnecessary since it is immaterial that a stranger may
enforce a contract against him.
Finally, an analysis of German agency law reveals that in
reaching its decision, a court will apply the principles of equity
and will not permit one party to prevail over another by merely
following the letter of the law and not its substance. Accord-
ingly, for the principal to comply with the standard of care gener-
ally expected of him, and thereby avoid unforeseen liability, he
must act prudently and in good faith while complying with the
general rule of law.
Edwin R. Holmes
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